



SC Chair Report

Topic 2: Addressing the Development of
Nuclear Weapons in Iran and North Korea

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
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Personal Statements

Chair – Carmen Armentia

I am Carmen Armentia, a student from the American School of Bilbao. I am 16 years old and I have attended around 8 MUN conferences. I am really excited to take this role and guide the debate in a diplomatic but very fun way. I can't wait for MUNISS 2025!



Deputy Chair – Tomas Siegel

My name is Tomas Siegel, and I will be your deputy chair in this year's MUNISS Security Council Committee. I am 17 years old and attend The International School Stuttgart. So far, I have attended 3 MUN conferences. I can't wait to collaborate with all of you to discuss and debate the issues at hand.



Introduction

The United Nations Security Council's role is to preserve security and peace concerning international relations. The Security Council concerns itself with issues and threats regarding international peace. The issue of nuclear weaponry is in issue at an SC level of importance primarily due to its impact on global and local peace and wide reaching implications for not only involved countries but the international community as a whole.. Additionally, seeing as past resolutions and sanctions have been passed with regard to this topic, the SC has an obligation to uphold it's duty and engage with this problem further.

Iran has one of the oldest nuclear programs in the Middle East, dating to 1957, when the Eisenhower administration signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a U.S. ally, under the 'Atoms for Peace' program. Western cooperation with Iran's nuclear industry ended after the 1979 Islamic revolution. (Slavin).

North Korea's nuclear program likewise has its roots in the early 1950s, with significant development beginning in the 1960s with the aid of Soviet engineers. With their help, North Korea constructed the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and an IRT-2000 research reactor in 1963 (Moltz and Mansourov) . While initially focused on peaceful nuclear energy, the program eventually became far more militarily focused. North Korea's first nuclear weapons test took place in 2006, even though North Korea ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985.

Glossary

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT): International Treaty aimed at preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful usage of Nuclear Energy.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): International organisation working to promote and monitor the peaceful use of Nuclear Energy.

P5: The five permanent members of UNSC, also known as Veto Powers.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): 2015 nuclear deal with Iran limiting its nuclear activities in exchange for sanction reliefs.

Six-party talks: Negotiations involving North Korea, South Korea, China, the US, Russia, and Japan to stop North Korea's weaponized nuclear program.

Byungjin Policy: North Korea's policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development.

Centrifuge: Machine used for uranium enrichment.

Weapons Grade Uranium: Uranium enriched to 90% or more, suitable for use in Nuclear Weaponry.

Breakout time: Estimated time a country needs to produce enough weapons grade uranium for one (1) Nuclear Warhead.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): long range missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads to different continents.

Nuclear Deterrence: The idea that possessing Nuclear weapons will make other countries less likely to mess with you.

The E3: France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Issue Explanation

The Development of Nuclear weaponry in Iran and North Korea remain pressing issues for the global community into 2025.

According to recent intelligence, collected during the last months of President Biden's term by American intelligence, Iran is currently trying to accelerate their way to a nuclear weapon (Sanger and Barnes). Despite the Islamic Republic's search for a shortcut to the bomb, Trump's second term as president presents a historic chance to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, Trump has repeatedly declared since taking office that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons (Stricker), a sentiment that many other countries second.

Meanwhile, North Korea has already demonstrated both Nuclear and Thermonuclear weapons capacities. Currently, North Korea is acting as a major local and global destabilising power. There are also concerns of a potential collaboration between the two countries (united against nuclear Iran), allowing Iran to accelerate its nuclear schedule and North Korea to gain some much needed resources.

Nuclear weaponry in any hands has serious security impacts on the region. In this case, the most affected regions are East Asia and the Middle East, both already high tension zones. In these regions, the heightened tension increases the risk of conventional war, proxy wars or even, in the worst case scenario, Nuclear War. While military tensions grow, both countries and the global community also suffer economic impacts. Various sanctions and bans have been imposed on both North Korea and Iran, affecting the civilian population. (Ichimasa).

Not addressing this issue could potentially lead to a more unstable global security, with more and more countries possibly feeling forced to create their own Nuclear Arsenals. Furthermore, it could weaken the NPT, leading to less developed countries losing access to Nuclear Power as a clean source of energy. Finally, with an increase in the nuclear weapons count worldwide, future disarmament could be made far more difficult.



The main affected parties as of right now are the people of Iran and North Korea, living under economic sanctions. In the future, the closest neighbouring countries could become seriously affected, with other countries in the area following soon after. Furthermore, Iran allegedly developed Long Range ICBMs with a range of 1 800 miles, far enough to reach Europe. Overall, with nuclear weapons being as dangerous and destructive as it is, there is no country on earth that can truly consider itself unaffected.



Perspectives of Parties Involved

Iran

Has recently shifted their messaging, focusing more on letting the world know that they have the capacity to build nuclear weapons and they are actively choosing not to. However, they are very clear that they would change their stance if their “existence were threatened” (Singh). Top Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed interest in closing a deal with the US in exchange for further sanction relief.

North Korea

Continues to play a destabilising role globally and also locally while actively engaging in nuclear tests to showcase their strength. Pyongyang has not expressed any concrete intentions, however prospects for cooperation with the US and its allies appear slim. (united against nuclear Iran)

United States of America

The Trump administration returned to maximum pressure policy against Iran, considering Military action. However, the white house has also been expressing interest in negotiating a new deal. The US policy focuses on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while coordinating economic and military pressure with its allies (Singh). With regards to North Korea, the US has not taken any concrete moves, however it has expressed concern over its history of Nuclear Missile exports.

European Union

Concerned by the actions and stances of both North Korea and Iran and their approach to nuclear safety. Cooperating with the US to coordinate pressure on Iran. The UK and France both expressed the possibility to reimpose sanctions on Iran using snapback mechanism if no compromise is reached by October 2025. (Davenport)

History of the Topic

Iran has one of the oldest nuclear programs in the Middle East, dating to 1957, when the Eisenhower administration signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a U.S. ally, under the 'Atoms for Peace' program. North Korea's nuclear program likewise has its roots in the early 1950s, with significant development beginning in the 1960s with the aid of Soviet engineers. With their help, North Korea constructed the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and an IRT-2000 research reactor in 1963 (Moltz and Mansourov).

Western cooperation with Iran's nuclear industry ended after the 1979 Islamic revolution. (Slavin). While initially focused on peaceful nuclear energy, the program eventually became far more militarily focused. In 1985 North Korea ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In those same years, Iran continued to develop its Nuclear infrastructure, signing treaties with China and Russia for reactor construction.

In the early 2000s and 2010s, tension began to rise drastically. In 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and in 2002, less than a decade later, the secret Iranian Natanz nuclear enrichment facility was revealed, raising general concerns.

Between 2003 and 2015, a series of sanctions agreements and treaties between world powers and Iran resulted in the JCPOA agreement. In 2018, during the first Trump Administration, withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Around the same time as the JCPOA was starting to take shape, North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT (in 2003) and conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 2006.



Potential Solutions for the issue:

An international agreement must be reached to prevent the future development of Nuclear weaponry. This may prove difficult since the delegations of both North Korea and Iran will likely defend their right to develop these weapons. Past attempts have mostly been met with a lack of success.

Diplomatic Solution:

The E3 and the USA have been pushing for renewed negotiations with Iran before the October 2025 deadline. North Korea has been actively sabotaging negotiations.

Economic measures:

Threatening economic sanctions and offering economic incentives in exchange for cooperation with the IAEA and allowing the implementations of verifiable limits on nuclear development.

Technical limitations:

Imposing technological development limitations, knowledge exchange limitations and technological trade limitations on Iran and North Korea to prevent further Nuclear Development

Regional Security Measures:

Granting similar nuclear capacity to other regional powers under strict supervision. Regional peace-building measures.

Final Option:

Give South Korea and Israel nukes, grab some popcorn and watch the world burn. (apocalypse speedrun, anyVersion, any%).

Previous Treaties

- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), meant to encourage peaceful use of nuclear technology. Originally ratified by North Korea.
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, meant to encourage Iran to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Previous Resolutions



- Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) [on suspension by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]
- Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) [on measures against Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]

Links

- <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2006-14.pdf>
- https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1835-2008.pdf
- <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/589783?v=pdf>
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"Find past passed resolution for the following issue: Denuclearisation of Iran and North Korea" prompt. Perplexity, Perplexity AI, 20 Feb. 2025, perplexity.ai. (Assisting in finding past resolutions on the issue)

"Could everyone please stop making stuff up then saying I said it?"
– Sun Tzu, the art of war



